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Abstract
What are worldviews? What are their characteristics? How do they
work? This article offers tentative responses to these questions
through the integration of concepts and narratives. Using the
biblical and the atheistic evolutionary narratives as case studies, it
also seeks to show how worldviews have a significant, though not
absolute, controlling effect on one’s perception of reality.
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Introduction
Scholars have defined worldviews in several ways across a broad spectrum.1
Minimally, these academics have described worldviews as conceptual lenses
through which people see the world.2 In recent decades, however, many
have noted that the reduction of worldviews to concepts is not sufficient to
For a brief history of the “worldview” concept, see Albert M. Wolters, “On the
Idea of Worldview and Its Relation to Philosophy,” in Stained Glass: Worldviews and
Social Science, ed. Paul A. Marshall, Sander Griffioen, and Richard J. Mouw (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1989), 14–25. For an anthropological perspective,
see Paul G. Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews: An Anthropological Understanding of
How People Change (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 13–30. For a thorough
work on the topic, see David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 2002).
1

2
See Gürol Irzik and Robert Nola, “Worldviews and Their Relation to Science,”
in Science, Worldviews and Education, ed. Michael R. Matthews (Basel, Switzerland:
Springer, 2009), 83; Mikael Stenmark, “Worldview,” in Encyclopedia of Science and
Religion, ed. J. Wentzel Vrede van Huyssteen et al. (New York: Macmillan, 2003),
2:929; Ronald H. Nash, Worldviews in Conflict: Choosing Christianity in a World of
Ideas (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 16; James H. Olthuis, “On Worldviews,” in
Marshall, Griffioen, and Mouw, Stained Glass, 26–40.
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adequately portray people’s view of reality.3 Instead, scholars have increasingly acknowledged the narrative character of worldviews: that is, to different
degrees, many have come to define worldviews as stories that shape our understanding of life.4 While the integration of these two emphases—concepts
and narratives—has not always been seamless,5 in this article, I propose an

3
“There has been a tendency in modern Western thought to reduce worldview
beliefs to a propositional format. . . . In reality, however, the philosophical and religious
beliefs of human beings are more commonly shared and passed down through story,
not through a set of philosophical propositions. . . . For the vast majority of people
past and present, worldview is narrative in structure.” Tawa J. Anderson, W. Michael
Clark, and David K. Naugle, An Introduction to Christian Worldview: Pursuing God’s
Perspective in a Pluralistic World (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2017), 14; cf.
Steve Wilkens and Mark L. Sanford, Hidden Worldviews: Eight Cultural Stories that
Shape Our Lives (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 17; Michael W. Goheen
and Craig G. Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Christian
Worldview (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), xiv.
4
E.g., “All worldviews originate in a grand story of one sort or another.” Craig G.
Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen, Christian Philosophy: A Systematic and Narrative Introduction (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 16. “In order to make sense
of our lives we depend on some story. Some story provides the broader framework of
meaning for every part of our lives.” Craig G. Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen,
The Drama of Scripture: Finding Our Place in the Biblical Story, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2014), 18. “A worldview is like a story, and nowadays I think it is
the best way to put it.” Gregory Koukl, The Story of Reality (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 27. “We prefer the concept of worldview as story.” Wilkens and Sanford,
Hidden Worldviews, 17. All emphases added. Cf. Alister E. McGrath, Narrative Apologetics: Sharing the Relevance, Joy, and Wonder of the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 2019), 9; Hugh Lacey, “The Interplay of Scientific Activity, Worldviews, and
Value Outlooks,” in Matthews, Science, Worldviews and Education, 193.
5
An example of the difficulty of integrating the two emphases can be seen in
Sire’s updated definition (since the 4th ed.). He states that “a worldview . . . can be
expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions” (emphasis added). James W. Sire,
The Universe Next Door: A Basic Worldview Catalogue, 5th ed. (Downers Grove, IL:
IVP Academic, 2009), 20. Another example comes from Hiebert, who does not use
story or narrative in his definition but uses these terms repeatedly throughout his work
to unpack what worldviews are. See Transforming Worldviews, 25–26, 31, 49, 152–53.
The dilemma is also present in Anderson, Clark, and Naugle, Introduction to Christian
Worldview. They work with narrative in chapter 4 and with propositions in chapter 5.
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integrative definition, as others have done,6 to assess the controlling effect7
worldviews have on the interpretation of data. In order to demonstrate the
phenomenon, I will work with two influential and largely competing8 world6
“Worldview is an articulation of the basic beliefs embedded in a shared grand
story.” Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 23, emphasis added. “Thus,
while propositional beliefs are an essential aspect of worldview examination, these spring
from the messy process that we call ‘our story.’” Wilkens and Sanford, Hidden Worldviews, 17–18, emphasis added. “All knowledge of realities external to oneself takes
place within the framework of a worldview, of which stories form an essential part,”
emphasis added; “worldviews provide the stories through which humans beings view
reality,” emphasis original. N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 45, 123.
7
N. T. Wright uses the expression controlling stories (New Testament and the
People of God, 42n28), which, in turn, he links to Nicholas Wolterstorff ’s control beliefs
(Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2nd ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988], ch.
1). See also note 99 below.
8
I do not advocate the conflict view between science and religion. Historically, it
is a well-known fact that “virtually all of the most prominent figures in the historiography of the Scientific Revolution were religious, devout, and some of them extremely
so.” John Henry, “Religion and the Scientific Revolution,” in The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, ed. Peter Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 39. In this regard, Stark has shown that of the most illustrious scientists
of the Scientific Revolution (from 1543 to those born until 1680), “61.5%” were
devout, “34.7%” were religious (but not devout), and only “3.8%” were skeptics.
Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science,
Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003),
160–62. For a robust and yet accessible treatment of the religious aspects of the Scientific Revolution, see James Hannam, The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle
Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2011). Later, in
the nineteenth century, the very term scientist was coined by the Anglican priest and
eminent British scientist William Whewell in 1834 (see Frank M. Turner, Contesting Cultural Authorities: Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993], 177). Even in evolutionary thought, the great upgrade of the
modern synthesis results largely from the work of Gregor J. Mendel (1822–1884), an
Augustinian friar and pioneer geneticist. Charles Darwin himself “sent four sons . . .
to be educated by Anglican clergymen” (James R. Moore, review of Charles Darwin
and the Problem of Creation, by Neal C. Gillespie, British Journal for the History of
Science 14.2 [1981]: 197). Sensitive to this historical background, I argue that these
two grand stories—the biblical and the atheistic evolutionary narratives—in some
instances are incompatible. Some of their differences, in turn, generate tension in the
areas of science and religion.
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views in the West as case studies: the biblical9 and the atheistic evolutionary10
models.11 Thus, intermediate positions that fall under the umbrella of theistic
9
The term biblical narrative in this article refers to the interpretive framework
provided by the grand story found in the “common canonical core,” or the sixty-six
books shared by Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant traditions; see John C. Peckham,
Canonical Theology: The Biblical Canon, Sola Scriptura, and Theological Method (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016), 52n15. While the various books of the common canonical
core may provide different perspectives from each other—warranting different theologies for each one of them—they still contribute to one grand story, however nuanced
it may be by each of those books.

The discussion of atheistic evolutionary models will include models that work
with ontological as well as methodological naturalism, though the latter does not
necessarily entail atheistic positions. The reason why models that are informed by
methodological naturalism (MN) may be considered atheistic in this article is that
when MN is applied to the historical sciences, it excludes supernatural intelligent
causes a priori and thus, for all practical purposes, functions like an atheistic model.
10

Several authors recognize that these are both the most influential and most
antagonistic points of view in the Western world. For instance, “in our contemporary
culture . . . two quite different stories are told. One is the story of evolution . . . the other
is the one embodied in the Bible. . . . These are two different and incompatible stories.”
Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralistic Society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989),
15–16, quoted in Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 7. McGrath
observes, “One of the most interesting developments of the twentieth century has been
the growing trend to regard Darwinian theory as transcending the category of provisional scientific theories, and constituting a ‘worldview.’ Darwinism is here regarded as
establishing a coherent worldview through its evolutionary narrative, which embraces
such issues as the fundamental nature of reality, the physical universe, human origins,
human nature, society, psychology, values, and destinies. While being welcome by
some, others have expressed alarm at this apparent failure to distinguish between
good, sober, and restrained science on the one hand, and non-empirical metaphysics,
fantasy, myth, and ideology on the other. . . . In the view of some, this transition has
led to Darwinism becoming a religion or atheist faith.” Alister E. McGrath, “The
Ideological Uses of Evolutionary Biology in Recent Atheist Apologetics,” in Biology
and Ideology: From Descartes to Dawkins, ed. Denis R. Alexander and Ronald Numbers
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 331. In this sense, Michael Ruse states,
“Evolution is promoted by its practitioners as more than mere science. Evolution is
promulgated as an ideology, a secular religion—a full-fledged alternative to Christianity, with meaning and morality. . . . Evolution is a religion. This was true of evolution
in the beginning, and it is true of evolution still today. . . . Evolution therefore came
into being as a kind of secular ideology, an explicit substitute for Christianity.” See
“How Evolution Became a Religion: Creationists Correct?” National Post, 13 May
2000, B1, B3, B7, quoted in Thomas B. Fowler and Daniel Kuebler, The Evolution
Controversy: A Survey of Competing Theories (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007),
41; see also Mary Midgley, Evolution as a Religion, rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 2002).
While I agree with Ruse that these two worldviews compete in many ways, I do not
frame the discussion with the term Christianity because it embraces a vast spectrum of
11
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evolution, though significantly representative of a range of views, are outside
the scope of this article.12
Beyond this narrative approach, there is also a third tier of meaning
in which worldviews are not only the interplay of concepts and stories but
encompass one’s “background.”13 In this maximal sense, worldviews are not
theoretical abstractions but are embodied in one’s way of life and permanently
influenced by one’s total experience. Unfortunately, due to their individual
character and infinite degree of variability, worldviews in their maximal sense
are difficult to evaluate and thus, to a certain extent, lie outside the scope of
this article.
Hence, I will start with an integrative definition of the term worldview
in its narrative context (a grand story). After that, I will go over the major
ontological components of worldviews as well as their general characteristics. Next, I will assess what grand stories do and suggest a contemporary
metaphor to illustrate their function. Then I will focus on two specific grand
stories—the biblical and the atheistic evolutionary narratives—as case studies
through which I intend to illustrate the controlling effect of worldviews on
the interpretation of perceived reality.
Working Definition
As a number of scholars have recently noticed, concepts and narratives are
not either-or, but both-and categories as they relate to worldviews, the former
being embedded in the latter. Thus, in this article, I speak of worldviews as
taking into account both emphases simultaneously and in a complementary
fashion. For this purpose, I offer the following minimal working definition:
a worldview is a grand story within which several interconnected concepts
are present and, in their narrative context, serve as parameters for people
to interpret reality.14 With this brief definition, I acknowledge that various
positions with varying interpretations of the Bible throughout history. Instead, I frame
it with what I call the biblical narrative, which provides a more stable source for the
discussion. Moreover, the biblical narrative offers a grand story that often differs from
traditional Christian interpretations.
12
For those wishing to pursue theistic evolutionary views, I suggest Robert C.
Bishop et al., Understanding Scientific Theories of Origins: Cosmology, Geology, and
Biology in Christian Perspective (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2018) and J. P.
Moreland et al., eds., Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological
Critique (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2017). While the former presents favorable views,
the latter offers critical perspectives of theistic evolution.

See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2007), 173.
13

This definition goes beyond reductionistic approaches (worldviews as concepts)
to a midrange one (worldviews as concepts within a narrative template). It does not
14

272

Andrews University Seminary Studies 57 (Fall 2019)

concepts indeed inform one’s view of reality, but they are not loose in one’s
mind; rather, they are organized (even if subconsciously) in a historical or
narrative template.15 In other words, narratives provide the context within
which the concepts and propositions operate.16 Concepts and propositions,
in turn, cooperate with our understanding of the narratives.17
Major Components & Environments
Worldviews are made up of too many elements to discuss them all. There
are, however, some major components—also known as macro-hermeneutical
principles18—that stand out when assessing them. These are God, the cosmos,
and humanity.19 I will also briefly mention some of the interrelationships
between them as well as the environments in which they operate.
encompass, however, maximalist approaches (worldviews as they are individually and
variously embodied in practice).
15
It should be noted that scholars who explain worldviews as conceptual frameworks
are also aware that such concepts are not loosely held by people; they often explicitly define
the term worldview as “a network of interconnected ideas” (Kenneth Richard Samples,
“Worldview,” in Dictionary of Christianity and Science, ed. Paul Copan et al. [Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2017], 688) or “a system in which the individual pieces [beliefs] fit together
into an interlocking, interconnected, coherent, and consistent whole” (Richard DeWitt,
Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science, 2nd ed. [Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010], 9); all emphases added. However, narrative (or story) seems
preferable to merely system because the former is more comprehensive and natural to how
we perceive and communicate reality than the latter.
16
Vanhoozer explains that outside its narrative context, “a proposition has no
communicative function,” for “it has been dedramatized.” According to him, narratives
ask readers to look at reality from a certain angle. “Narratives do more than chronicle;
they configure.” Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic
Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 91, 282;
emphases original.
17
“There is a mutual dependence between the two [between concepts and narratives].” Kenneth Bergland, email to author, 9 October 2018.
18
For an explanation of macro-, meso-, and micro-hermeneutical principles, see
Fernando Canale, “Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?” AUSS 44.1 (2006): 95–130.

These three components—God, the cosmos, and humanity—deal with ontology
(what is or exists), and thus are also known as principles of reality, i.e., categories in which
reality can be described. See Fernando Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology:
Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2005), 21.
As Giannetto explains it, “Every theory, as well as every different formulation of a theory
implies a different worldview: a particular image of Nature implies a particular image
of God . . . as well as of mankind and their relationship.” Enrico R. A. Giannetto, “The
Electromagnetic Conception of Nature at the Root of the Special and General Relativity
Theories and Its Revolutionary Meaning,” in Matthews, Science, Worldviews and Education, 117. Cf. Wright, New Testament and the People of God, 122–123.
19
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God
Worldviews have described God/the Divine, or the lack thereof,20 in widely
different ways. In some scenarios, God is a personal Being, while in others,
the Divine is an impersonal realm or organizing principle. In some, God is
described as a single person, and in others as a complex/plural person. There
is also the idea of a multitude of gods, both as higher and as lower gods. In
terms of attitude, especially concerning to humans, God has been depicted
as distant, uninterested, and even evil. On the other hand, where God is
portrayed as a person, he has also been portrayed as accessible, close, attentive,
caring, merciful, and good.
When seeking to understand the reality of this category, many questions
are often raised. Is there a God? If so, is God in control of everything? In all
details? If not, what is God in control of? Is God all-powerful and all-knowing?
If so, why doesn’t God end suffering, injustice, and death? If not, is God still
God, after all? What is God like in essence? Is God spirit, matter, both, or
something else? Is God everywhere? Or just somewhere? Is God identical to
the cosmos? Or just part of it? Is God wholly other than the cosmos? Does
God interact with our world? Can God interact? Does God interact in our
plane, or just in another level or dimension? Does God also communicate
with us in a cognitive way? If so, how? If not, why not? Can we communicate
with God? If so, how? If God is all-knowing, why should we communicate
with him at all?
The Cosmos
In this category, we are talking about the universe in general and also about
our world in particular. We could refer to this category as “nature” in a broad
sense.21 Here, we can also ask a multitude of questions. For instance, what
is the nature of the universe? What is it made of? When did it come about?
Has it always existed? Will it ever end? Is it expanding, collapsing, or both?
How would that make sense? Who/what caused it to exist? How does it work?
Does it follow laws, or is it just random? Why? Are there other universes? Is
the universe complete, finished? Or is it developing? Does development take
place in phases, or is it ongoing? Are such processes guided or unguided? Are
there other intelligences out there? Or is it just us? If there are, where are they?
20
Though framed from a theistic perspective, this component (God) is helpful
as a category even when discussing atheistic worldviews because, in such paradigms, a
divine cause or creator is usually explicitly denied. So, as a category, it is often present
in such worldviews, even if utilizing negation. As Giannetto clarifies, “Atheism too
has a particular image of God” (“Electromagnetic Conception of Nature,” 117). Cf.
Wright, New Testament and the People of God, 123.
21
See Erica W. Carlson, “Nature,” in Copan et al., Dictionary of Christianity and
Science, 474.
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Do they relate to us? Will they ever relate to us? Why don’t they relate to us?
Are there limits to the universe? Or is it infinite? Is it real or just an illusion?
On our planet, have things always been the way they are? Can we be sure of
that? If not, how could things have been different in the past? Why?
Humanity
Who are humans? Are human beings the apex of evolutionary processes on
earth? Are humans still evolving? How does that happen? Are human beings
divine? Are we divine-like? Could we have been created? Have we evolved
or decayed since then? In what sense? Biological, technological? What about
morally? Is there such a thing? What are humans made of? Are we purely
material? Do we have an immaterial part? If so, is the immaterial self the
real essence of humans? Is it eternal? Can the immaterial part consciously
function without the material part? Could our traditional assumptions about
human nature be mistaken? If so, how? What are the alternatives we are not
exploring? Can we have different explanations for consciousness? Are we good
or evil by nature? Could we be a little bit of both? Do we exhaust reality with
our senses? Could our senses be limited in their apprehension of reality? In
other words, do we perceive everything there is? How could we be sure of that?
If not, what could we be missing? Furthermore, what would the implications
be for our understanding of reality in that case?
Whatever answers we give to these questions express our understanding
of God, the cosmos, and human beings, and these ideas become hermeneutical presuppositions to interpret everything else. They are our fundamental assumptions about reality, what we take for granted, usually without
examination. That is, once defined, these concepts operate in our reasoning
processes before we engage with other data. Thus, they are referred to as a
priori assumptions. They form our “index of reality”22 against which we assess
the validity or truthfulness of anything else. This is why these categories—
God, the cosmos, and humanity—are the principal components of worldviews. These ontological categories are the core elements of any worldview.
If changed, these components cause a major reconfiguration of the entire
system, as opposed to peripheral components that, while important, do not
produce as dramatic a change in the grand scheme of things.23 Thus, identity,
22
The expression index of reality is taken from Robert J. Richards, “The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology,” in History and Evolution, ed.
Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1992), 24, 26, quoted in Fernando Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology:
An Introduction to the Scientific and Theological Methods (Libertador San Martín,
Argentina: Editorial Universidad Adventista del Plata, 2009), 76.
23
I am indebted to DeWitt for the idea of “core” and “peripheral” beliefs, which
I adapt and apply here to the major components of worldviews (see Worldviews, 11).
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convictions, values/ethics, actions/behavior,24 and to a certain extent even
epistemology (how we come to know things),25 as important as they may be,
are substantially derived from our understanding of these three foundational
components and their interactions.
Several factors affect the relationships between these components; here,
I will mention just a few. One is the environment in which the major components interact. In other words, on what level or in what sphere could God,
humans, and the world interact? This has to do with issues of time and space.
Is God in a timeless sphere? Why so? Or why not? Is God compatible with
time (the historical sequence of events we experience)? Are humans merely
temporal beings (functioning consciously in time only)? Do humans have an
eternal soul? Or don’t they? The answers one gives to these questions become
major assumptions that condition one’s understanding of the interaction
between God and humans.26 If the environments in which God and humans
operate are different and incompatible (e.g., time vs. timeless), this may create
major obstacles for their relationship.27 In addition, time scales profoundly
affect worldviews. Due to their defining effects on reality perception, the
issues of deep, recent, or hybrid time scales, among others, must also be
considered.
General Characteristics
When one looks at the characteristics that scholars have observed in worldviews, several different traits come to the fore. Examining some of these can
be helpful, as they highlight possible nuances and also make us sensitive to
what worldviews do and how they function. Below are some common attributes of worldviews described in the literature.
1. Deep. Core commitments that shape one’s worldview are usually not
noticed at the surface level.28 From a societal perspective, similarly, world24

Phrase adapted from Wilkens and Sanford, Hidden Worldviews, 19.

“Epistemology and ontology are co-dependent. Our concept of ontology
assumes already that some epistemological questions have been answered. Our
concept of epistemology assumes the answer to some ontological questions.” Oliver
Glanz, communication with author, 17 April 2020.
25

See Fernando Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and
Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (PhD diss., Andrews University, 1983).
26

27
See Fernando Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology: A Hermeneutical Study of the Revelation and Inspiration of the Bible (Berrien Springs, MI:
Andrews University Lithotech, 2005); Idem, Basic Elements of Christian Theology,
40–74.

See the iceberg metaphor in E. Randolph Richards and Brandon J. O’Brien,
Misreading Scripture with Western Eyes: Removing the Cultural Blinders to Better Understand Scripture (Downers Grove, IL: InterVaristy Press, 2012), 12.
28
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views are deep and “unseen structures underlying the entire explicit culture.”29
For this reason, they often go unnoticed to most observers.
2. Not Immediately Apparent to Possessors.30 People are often unaware or
unconscious of their worldviews,31 both what these worldviews are and what
they do.32 It is common for worldviews and the core commitments embedded in them to become apparent to their possessors only once contrasted,33
challenged,34 or reflected upon.35
3. Presuppositional. “Worldviews are pretheoretical in nature,” that
is, “they develop prior to or devoid of conscious reflection and rational
deliberation.”36 Worldviews are formed as people go through life and are
influenced by their parents, friends, teachers, educational systems, religion,
media, their own experiences, and so forth.37 Once established, one’s foundational components for understanding reality—notions of God, the cosmos,
and humanity, along with other peripheral commitments—become a priori
convictions that shape all a posteriori perceptions.38 As a result of their presuppositional nature, such foundational assumptions are what some call faith
commitments.39 In this sense, worldviews have precedence over philosophy
and science.40 This is because philosophy and science are inevitably done with
29

Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 32.

30

This assumes a maximal approach to worldviews.

See Nash, Worldviews in Conflict, 25; Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 90;
Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 25; Bartholomew and Goheen,
Christian Philosophy, 13.
31

32

Anderson, Clark, and Naugle, Introduction to Christian Worldview, 15.

It is frequently easier for an outsider to perceive these assumptions than for an
insider to do so.
33

34

See Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 47.

35

Ibid, 47.

36

Anderson, Clark, and Naugle, Introduction to Christian Worldview, 14.

37

Cf. ibid, 14–15.

“Knowing always takes place within the context of prior belief. To grow
in knowledge, one must make at least a provisional commitment to a framework
of thought, to accept something as a ‘given’ on trust and then to go on to test it.”
Vanhoozer explaining Lesslie Newbigin and Augustine in The Drama of Doctrine, 295.
“When . . . we perceive external reality, we do so within a prior framework. That
framework consists, most fundamentally, of a worldview.” Wright, New Testament and
the People of God, 43.
38

39
See Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 23–24. “Science does
have worldview content even in its presuppositions and method.” Irzik and Nola,
“Worldviews and Their Relation to Science,” 87.
40

Cf. Michael R. Matthews, “Science, Worldviews and Education: An Intro-
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the fundamental assumptions provided by one’s worldview.41 Obviously, such
presuppositional commitments “may be true, partially true or entirely false.”42
4. Narrative. The major, as well as the derivative components of worldviews and their interactions, are not dealt with in a static vacuum. These
concepts are dynamically processed within a story framework that provides
the context in which they can be understood.43
5. Real. This refers to historical correspondence or consistency with
reality.44 Worldview stories claim “to be the true story of the world.”45 That is,
even when making use of metaphorical language or highly symbolic imagery,
worldviews attempt to portray reality, not an illusory or imagined world.
6. Internally Coherent.46 For a worldview to operate well, its different
parts must be able to integrate and form a functional whole. Some worldviews
do this better than others. Often, such consistency requires the connection of
diverse and sometimes disparate parts into one overarching whole.

duction,” in Science, Worldviews and Education, 9–10; Irzik and Nola, “Worldviews
and Their Relation to Science,” 87, 90; Giannetto, “Electromagnetic Conception of
Nature,” 118. Bishop summarizes it well: “Presuppositions can only be motivated or
justified as elements of a larger philosophical or theological view. So, the sciences are
dependent on deep, underlying philosophical commitments just like any other human
inquiry. . . . In this sense, the sciences are in a position of trust not unlike religious
commitment.” Robert C. Bishop, “Science, Limits of,” in Copan et al., Dictionary of
Christianity and Science, 591.
41
“A worldview . . . is deeper than either philosophy or science; indeed,
philosophy and science stand upon the foundation of one’s worldview.” Goheen and
Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 13. Giannetto also observes, “One particular
formulation or interpretation of a scientific theory can dominate over other interpretations within the scientific community and constitute a scientific paradigm for
reasons external to science, that is for ideological reasons” (“Electromagnetic Conception
of Nature,” 131; emphases added).
42

Sire, The Universe Next Door, 21.

For the use of narrative by scientists, especially in regards to human evolution,
see Misia Landau, “Human Evolution as Narrative,” American Scientist 72 (1984):
262–268, cited in John R. Durant, “Evolution, Ideology and World View: Darwinian
Religion in the Twentieth Century,” in History, Humanity and Evolution: Essays for
John C. Greene, ed. James R. Moore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
360, 371n12.
43

Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton, The Transforming Vision: Shaping a
Christian World View (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 37–38.
44

45
Goheen and Bartholomew state that this is a reference to the biblical and
Western stories. See Living at the Crossroads, 7. However, the statement is an equally
valid description of a number of other worldviews.
46

Walsh and Middleton, The Transforming Vision, 38.

278

Andrews University Seminary Studies 57 (Fall 2019)

7. Universal, Inescapable, and Unique.47 “Because everybody has a worldview, there are literally countless worldviews held by people across the globe.
Each worldview is unique to its owner. No two people have precisely identical
worldviews.”48
8. Existential. Human beings are often interested in finding adequate
responses to questions of ultimate significance, viz., their deep existential
concerns. Walsh and Middleton organize these as four basic questions: “(1)
Who Am I? … (2) Where am I? … (3) What’s wrong? … (4) What is the remedy?”49
9. Comprehensive. Worldviews attempt to tell a story that makes sense of
large chunks of reality. Sometimes, they are even “all-embracing,”50 explaining the whole history of the world. In this sense, they are sometimes called
metanarratives.51
47

Uniqueness assumes a maximal approach to worldviews.

48

Anderson, Clark, and Naugle, Introduction to Christian Worldview, 22.

49

Walsh and Middleton, The Transforming Vision, 35; emphases original.

Goheen and Bartholomew describe the biblical and Western cultural stories as
all-embracing. See Living at the Crossroads, 7, 75. This does not seem to be the case
for many non-Abrahamic and non-Western worldviews (a point made by David J.
Hamstra; email to author, 29 October 2018).
50

51
Note that Jean-François Lyotard’s postmodern critique of metanarratives (The
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984], xxiv) was not unqualified. He was critiquing modernity (the Enlightenment’s naïve belief in the inexorable march toward progress) and ideologies that arose
from it, such as “Marxist Utopia . . . and . . . the triumph of science,” which had “‘lost
their credibility’ since the Second World War.” Christopher Butler, Postmodernism:
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 13. Moreover,
postmodern thought is skeptical of any and all kinds of authoritative discourse, not
only of metanarratives. That being said, there are potential problems associated with
metanarratives. Grand narratives may not “allow for disputes about value, and often
enough lead to totalitarian persecution” (Butler, Postmodernism, 14). Such scenarios
may arise out of the universal and potentially coercive nature of metanarratives.
In assessing how these charges may apply to the biblical metanarrative, J. Richard
Middleton and Brian J. Walsh argue that two “antitotalizing factors” are built into the
biblical story that potentially subvert its oppressive use, namely, “a radical sensitivity
to suffering” and “God’s overarching creational intent that delegitimizes any narrow,
partisan use of the story” (Truth Is Stranger than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a
Postmodern Age [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995], 87–107; emphases
original). MacIntyre also critiques postmodern deconstruction of narratives, pointing
out that such “deconstructionists . . . have not abandoned narrative at all. . . . This
can be seen first simply by recognizing that the method . . . they have used to undermine ‘master narratives’ is effective precisely because it provides a counternarrative,
not the absence of narrative.” See Diogenes Allen and Eric O. Springsted, Philosophy
for Understanding Theology, 2nd ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007),
236–237. On the unavoidability of metanarratives, see Yi, “Despite their uses, abuses,
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10. Limited. Even though worldviews attempt to explain the whole
of reality, at the personal level, one’s worldview is necessarily partial and
fragmentary. In this functional sense, worldviews “will inevitably be a mixture
of truth and error.”52 In other words, even if the adopted story is a veritable
representation of reality, each person’s understanding of its elements and their
interactions is limited, deficient, and provisional.53
11. Embodied.54 From an existential perspective, what matters is how
worldviews are lived out (embodied), not so much the discourse about them
(theoretical constructs). In actuality, there are varying levels of internal appropriation of worldview stories. This disconnect between theory and practice
is what some label “incongruity.”55 In addition, there is the issue of several
competing stories being appropriated simultaneously. In such syncretic
scenarios, the embodied experience manifests elements of more than one
story.
12. Deeply Affected by the Background. One’s total experience and
surrounding influences deeply affect one’s perception of reality. When
speaking of worldviews in a maximal sense, this must be taken into account.
However, given the infinite variability of this element, it is difficult to assess,
measure, or value it.
13. Resistant to Change. The “underlying, hidden level of culture . . .
defines the way in which people see the world.” This deep structure, also
known as “PL [primary level] culture,” is “particularly resistant to manipulative attempts to change it from the outside.”56 Though enduring, worldview
commitments are not immutable: they can change in the face of critical
reflection, better explanations, and experiences that challenge them.57
and short-comings, it turns out that master narratives are unavoidable.” Zane G. Yi,
“Telling a Better Story: Reasoning about God in a Secular Age,” Spectrum 43.4 (Fall
2015): 40; cf. McGrath, Narrative Apologetics, 10; Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews,
27n6.
52

Anderson, Clark, and Naugle, Introduction to Christian Worldview, 14.

This requires an openness to constant correction and fine-tuning of one’s
worldview in order to further improve its correspondence to reality.
53

54

This characteristic assumes a maximal approach to worldviews.

55

Wilkens and Sanford, Hidden Worldviews, 22.

Edward T. Hall, Hidden Differences: How to Communicate with the Germans,
Studies in International Communication (Hamburg, Germany: Stern, 1983), 6–7,
quoted in Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 32.
56

57
For an example of a biblical theist who became an evolutionist, see Karl W.
Giberson, Saving Darwin: How to Be a Christian and Believe in Evolution (New York:
HarperOne, 2008). For an example of an evolutionist who became a theist, see Matti
Leisola and Jonathan Witt, Heretic: One Scientist’s Journey from Darwin to Design
(Seattle: Discovery Institute Press, 2018).
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14. Partly Non-Empirical. Due to their comprehensive scope, worldviews
sometimes deal with inaccessible and unobservable past phenomena as well
as unknown future scenarios. Certainly, researchers subscribing to different
worldviews may use scientific tools and experimentation to attempt to trace
and theoretically reconstruct past events as well as estimate future possibilities. These efforts, however, are different from present and repeatable empirical research.
Function
How do worldviews work? A variety of metaphors are usually used to explain
how worldviews function, such as maps, eyes, lenses, etc. The common thread
in these analogies is that worldviews describe “how the world is,” and thus
provide guidance so that people can navigate life.58 That is, by seeing reality
in a certain way, people may be better able to make decisions on how to live
their lives. Unlike entertaining stories that provide an escape from the world,
worldview stories invite us to interpret reality through them.59 In this sense,
worldviews function as interpretative grids60 that mediate reality.61
The mediatory role that worldviews play can serve positive as well as
negative (restrictive) functions. Here I discuss just a few of these.62 Positively,
worldviews organize the different parts of perceived reality into a whole
through a process of selection, editing, and weaving perspectives and trajectories in an often historical or history-like template.63 This process brings
meaning to otherwise unintelligible, seemingly unrelated, disparate pieces. It
is precisely this narrative configuration of reality that allows people to find
their place in the story and through it a sense of personal identity, a place in
society/community, and values to live by. As Neil Postman puts it, “without a
narrative, life has no meaning.”64
Another positive function is that the “mental models of deeply ingrained
assumptions, generalizations, or pictures and images” that worldviews
provide are “the foundations on which to build our systems of explanation
and supply rational justification for belief in these systems.”65 In this way,
58

Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 25.

Goheen and Bartholomew make this argument in reference to the biblical
story, but their point is equally applicable to other worldviews. See idem, 3–4.
59

60

See Naugle, Worldview, 301–302.

61

See Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 17.

62

For a more extended treatment, see Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 28–69.

63

Cf. idem, 28.

Neil Postman, The End of Education: Redefining the Value of School (New York:
Vintage, 1995), 6, quoted in Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 169.
64

65

Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 29.

Worldviews: Concepts or Narratives?

281

worldviews provide people with emotional stability, reassuring us that “the
world is truly as we see it.”66 Moreover, worldviews help people perceive
and assess “cultural change.” Since modifications in thought patterns “may
introduce assumptions that undermine our cognitive order,” worldviews
help people to examine such challenges critically by either “adopt[ing],”
“reject[ing],” or “reinterpret[ing]” changes according to the preestablished
index of reality provided by the grand story.67
Now turning to the negative function, it is important to observe that
worldviews filter reality, acting “in a regulatory fashion.”68 One reason for this
is the impossibility of processing all of reality. The amount of information is
infinite. Thus, in order for people to function, they must selectively choose
what information to deal with. In this sense, worldviews function as hermeneutical sifters that “both enable us to see reality and blind us from seeing it
fully.”69 While the beneficial outcome is functionality, the downside to this
characteristic is that phenomena that do not fit our preestablished categories
tend to go unnoticed. We don’t “see” them. As Thomas Kuhn put it while
describing the scientific enterprise, “those [phenomena] that will not fit the
box [paradigm] are often not seen at all.”70
On the other hand, when people do notice things that do not fit their
paradigm, this can lead to a worldview crisis,71 which can be very uncomfortable, painful, and disorienting.72 Solving the crisis usually entails the expansion of one’s worldview to accommodate the anomaly.73 If the adjustment
cannot be made, the crisis might require a significant reconfiguration of the
whole system and, thus, of life. Due to the anguish this may involve, people
cannot maintain a worldview crisis indefinitely. Stability is needed to live a
normal and flourishing life. At the same time, even though worldview crises
66

Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 29–30.

Charles H. Kraft, Christianity in Culture: A Study in Dynamic Biblical Theologizing in Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1979), 56, as expressed by
Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 29–30.
67

68

Naugle, Worldviews, 303.

69

Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 23.

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 24. Even though Kuhn describes a narrower
concept, that of scientific paradigms, his rationale equally applies to our grander
paradigm of worldviews.
70

71

See Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 30.

“To question worldviews is to challenge the very foundations of life, and people
resist such challenges with deep emotional reactions. There are few human fears greater
than a loss of a sense of order and meaning.” Hiebert, Transforming Worldviews, 84.
72

73

Cf. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th ed., 53, 77–78.
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are distressing, they can be liberating when they lead people to a better understanding of reality and a more positive vision of the future.74
A Contemporary Metaphor
One way to understand how worldviews work in our day and age is to think
of them as software:75 not any software, but base, controlling software.
Think, for instance, of the now nearly omnipresent76 smartphones and their
operating systems. As of 2018, over 3 billion smartphones run on iOS77
and Android,78 which are the operating systems for Apple and non-Apple
devices respectively.79
Consider how they work: iOS and Android perform tasks that help users
in their daily lives. One can check the weather, receive and send email and
74
For the role crises play in identity development and maturity in religious
contexts, see Tiago Baltazar and Ron Coffen, “The Role of Doubt in Religious
Identity Development and Psychological Maturity,” Journal of Research on Christian
Education 20.2 (2011): 182–194.
75
The insight about worldviews acting as software was taken and adapted from
Annette Simmons, The Story Factor: Inspiration, Influence, and Persuasion through
the Art of Storytelling, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Basic Books, 2006), 41, 44. Kevin J.
Vanhoozer—in his keynote lecture “Being Biblical in a Pluralistic Age” (paper read
at the “Transforming Worldview(s): Biblical Faithfulness in a Pluralistic Age” Symposium at Andrews University, Berrien Springs, MI, 18 October 2018)—brought to my
attention that Mary Poplin makes the same point and uses the expression “operating system” in Is Reality Secular? Testing the Assumptions of Four Global Worldviews
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014), 26–27.
76
“Two-thirds of the world’s 7.6 billion inhabitants now [30 January 2018] have
a mobile phone.” Simon Kemp, “Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4
Billion Mark,” We Are Social, https://wearesocial.com/blog/2018/01/global-digitalreport-2018, accessed on 19 April 2020.
77
1.3 billion iOS users worldwide as of 1 February 2018. “Apple Reports First
Quarter Results,” https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/02/apple-reports-firstquarter-results/, accessed on 19 April 2020.
78
Two billion Android users worldwide as of 17 May 2017. Google (@Google),
“Thanks to developers and our partners around the world, there are now more than
2 billion monthly active Android devices,” Twitter, 17 May 2017, 1:09 p.m., https://
twitter.com/Google/status/864890655906070529.

While the iOS/Android illustration is time sensitive and may not be helpful in
the future as technologies quickly change and make previous ones obsolete, the operating system analogy seems to be lasting, for all complex data processing mechanisms we
are aware of—both in nature and in human-developed technology—use such systems.
79

Worldviews: Concepts or Narratives?

283

text messages, call others, and so forth. Both systems do such things. Some
may prefer one over the other. But still, to a great degree, both help users go
about their lives.
These systems are always in operation. Many other kinds of software
(apps) can be running on a cell phone simultaneously. These apps can even
be in the foreground, appearing on the screen and performing their work.
However, the operating system, though invisible, is in charge. In fact, all
operations depend on and are controlled by the operating system.
There is also the issue of compatibility. If one desires to download and
use a specific app, one has to use an app that will connect with the appropriate
operating system. Thus, Apple users will select options from Apple’s “App
Store,”80 while Android users will choose something from “Google Play.”81
Google Play apps will not run on an iPhone. They are incompatible.
Worldviews, to a certain extent, can be understood in a similar way. They
are operational as people process information, relate to other people, deal
with situations, and make decisions in their daily lives. Though they are invisible at the surface level, their presence is ubiquitous. They are everywhere.
They inform every decision. They are present and manage everything from
an unseen and deeper structure. Furthermore, they are incompatible with
all kinds of information.82 They are open to “seeing” things in a certain way
and not open to “seeing” things in some other ways. When not functioning
well (unable to deal properly with reality), worldviews can be updated. In
fact, worldview formation is a “process” that requires constant “fine-tuning.”83
However, the update process can be very time-consuming. In general, the
closer to the core of the worldview the update is, the more time-consuming it
will be.84 Moreover, worldviews are sensitive to “bugs,” that is, smaller software
80
“App Store (iOS),” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/App_Store_
(iOS), accessed on 19 April 2020.

“Google Play,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Play,
accessed on 19 April 2020.
81

As Koukl explains it through the jigsaw puzzle metaphor, “pieces from one
puzzle usually cannot be mixed with pieces of another because they are made of different pictures.” The Story of Reality, 26.
82

While Wilkens and Sanford refer to the development of a Christian worldview,
their observation is valid for worldviews in general. Hidden Worldviews, 11.
83

84
Consider, for instance, an example from the biblical narrative. The apostle Paul
(then Saul) was a persecutor of the early church (Acts 7:58–8:3). But after encountering the risen Christ on the road to Damascus (9:1–9), Paul had to update his understanding of God to include Jesus. While the change might have been initiated in
that encounter, the reconfiguration of his whole understanding of life—as mediated
through his operating system, the Old Testament—may have taken a lot longer. Paul’s
letter to the Galatians gives us some clues as to how long the major update may have
taken. The text tells us that Paul spent three years in Arabia (Gal 1:17–18); it also
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(ideas, concepts, stories, etc.) that can undermine the optimum functioning of the primary system. Finally, in practice, we notice that people often
have various worldviews running simultaneously. While such syncretism is
common, it can be challenging because the diverse worldviews often lead to
different data interpretations, and thus, offer different—at times competing
and even mutually exclusive—approaches for dealing with reality.
The Biblical Narrative and Atheistic Evolutionary Models as Case Studies
Though several worldviews are part of the public consciousness in the West,
in this article, I limit the discussion85 to the comparison of two subcategories of theism and atheism, respectively: the biblical narrative (BN)86 on its
own terms87 and atheistic evolutionary models (AEMs).88 The reason for this
choice is their influential status and their placement at the two ends of a wide
spectrum of divine intervention.89 The assessment of these two narratives
should make apparent some of the controlling effect worldviews have on data
interpretation.
Ideally, it would be helpful, for dialogical and contextual purposes, to
provide minimal accounts of these stories side by side as they are understood
today90 and then suggest how they function as both guiding and restricting
mentions that after fourteen years Paul went to Jerusalem again (2:1). While scholars
do not agree on whether Paul’s first missionary journey was before or after this trip, it
is clear that most of what we know Paul did and wrote in the NT happened after those
fourteen years. In other words, Paul seems to have been ready for the great missions
of his life after a long “software update” process. This does not mean, however, that all
worldview updates take that long. The process can be much shorter. But in general,
updates that require new definitions for God, the cosmos, and humans (core components, or macro-hermeneutical assumptions) are very time-consuming because the
entire system needs to be reprocessed in order to accommodate those changes.
85

Theistic evolutionary models are not considered in this article (see n. 12).

86

See notes 9 and 95.

That is, observing the BN’s own narrative logic, internal consistency, and
embedded assumptions.
87

88
I use the expression atheistic evolutionary models (AEMs) to acknowledge a
range of possible scenarios within strictly naturalistic evolution, either ontological or
methodological (see n. 10).
89
Rau organizes the spectrum of options into six categories: Naturalistic Evolution, Nonteleological Evolution, Planned Evolution, Directed Evolution, Old-Earth
Creation, and Young-Earth Creation (Gerald Rau, Mapping the Origins Debate: Six
Models of the Beginning of Everything [Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2012], 41).
To his six-category schema, I add a seventh one, Old-Earth/Young-Life (as suggested
by my reading of the biblical narrative), which is a hybrid model of Rau’s categories
five and six.
90

Regarding the philosophical developments from the rise of modern evolution-
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software for interpreting reality. As it has been observed, “in trying to underary theory to today, some historical issues are important to consider. In the nineteenth
century, when the paradigmatic shift to solely materialistic research in the sciences
matured, the study of the biblical narrative had long been eclipsed by critical studies
seeking historical reconstructions (see Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics [New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974]) and disregarded by most scientists (see Neal C. Gillespie,
Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979]). The contested status of biblical revelation among intellectuals resulted
from several historical occurrences that cannot be explored here in detail. However,
mentioning a few of these philosophical and cultural changes is necessary at this point.
1) Since the seventeenth century, through the influence of Newtonian mechanistic
science, nature had begun to be “conceived as a law-bound system” (John C. Greene,
Darwin and the Modern World View [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press],
6). This led to the deistic notion that God would not intervene in creation, but only
act through secondary causes, i.e., through laws. Such philosophical shift made the
biblical narrative, which often describes God acting through direct intervention in
the world, untenable in the minds of many (see also John Hedley Brooke, “‘Laws
Impressed on Matter by the Creator’? The Origin and the Question of Religion,” in
The Cambridge Companion to the “Origin of Species”, ed. Michael Ruse and Richard J.
Richards [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 259–260, 263–264; John
Hedley Brooke, “Science and Secularization,” in Harrison, Cambridge Companion
to Science and Religion, 119; John Hedley Brooke, “Darwin and Victorian Christianity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 2nd ed., ed. Jonathan Hodge and
Gregory Radick [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 202–3; David L.
Hull, “Darwin’s Science and Victorian Philosophy of Science,” in Hodge and Radick,
Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 187; Jonathan R. Topham, “Natural Theology and
the Sciences,” in Harrison, Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, 74). 2) With
the decline of revealed theology, natural theology (“a type of theology which relies
on reason [which is natural], unaided by any evidence derived from God’s revelation [which is supernatural])” was revived, and theological arguments were generally
drawn from it, not from the biblical narrative. As early as “the start of the eighteenth
century . . . natural theology was a widely adopted practice” in Europe. And in the
following century, while “those who practiced science were Christians, and many . . .
were clergymen,” they articulated their views by means of natural theology (Topham,
“Natural Theology and the Sciences,” 59, 64, 70; cf. Greene, Darwin and the Modern
World View, 39–40). 3) Before Darwin, the dominant presupposition about nature
assumed a “static version of the doctrine of creation.” “As evidences of natural mutability accumulated,” this assumption, derived from natural theology and contemporary
culture, was undermined and eventually overthrown (Greene, Darwin and the Modern
World View, 40–41). 4) During the eighteenth century, a wide array of interpretations to explain the earth’s crust were offered by European scholars. In such context,
Rapaport notes that “those naturalists who made use of the flood often departed
considerably from the biblical text” (Rhoda Rapaport, “Geology and Orthodoxy: The
Case of Noah’s Flood in Eighteenth-Century Thought,” The British Journal for the
History of Science 11.1 [1978]: 8; while cognizant of studies of English geologists,
Rapaport assesses the situation mostly from the perspective of French scholars). These
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stand some phenomenon, especially some human phenomenon, . . . we must
four points, among others not covered here, suggest that both the biblical narrative
and its assumptions about the nature of reality had lost much of their influence at
the time of the rise of modern evolutionary theory. With a few exceptions, such as
the argument that human beings are made in the image of God (see Brooke, “The
Origin and the Question of Religion,” 268–270), the biblical narrative and its embedded assumptions exerted only an indirect influence on European elites by the time
Darwin’s Origin of Species was published in 1859. The biblical narrative was so underrepresented that historians of science interpret “the Darwinian ‘revolution’ . . . as the
triumph of a secular scientific paradigm over a religiously inspired natural theology”
(Brooke, “The Origin and the Question of Religion,” 259; emphasis added). With
these historical background markers in mind, I intend to compare in this article the
influence of the atheistic forms of the evolutionary narrative and the biblical narrative
as they are understood today. This entails benefiting from the scientific developments
of the past century and a half as well as the development of literary and hermeneutical approaches that are better suited to understanding the biblical narrative as a
whole, such as canonical and narrative theology. See Peckham, Canonical Theology;
Joel B. Green, “The (Re-)Turn to Narrative,” in Narrative Reading, Narrative Preaching: Reuniting New Testament Interpretation and Proclamation, ed. Joel B. Green and
Michael Pasquarello III (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 11–36; Craig G.
Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen, “Story and Biblical Theology,” in Out of Egypt:
Biblical Theology and Biblical Interpretation, Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 5, ed.
Craig Bartholomew et al. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 144–171; and Jo Ann
Davidson, “Biblical Narratives: Their Beauty and Truth,” AUSS 49.1 (2011): 149–158
(brought to my attention by Jônatas de Mattos Leal). Interestingly, while the biblical
narrative had been eclipsed, nineteenth-century England experienced the rise of the
evolutionary epic—in its theistic, agnostic, and atheistic varieties. Lightman pinpoints
the modern resurgence of this literary genre to the immensely successful publication
of Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of Natural History of Creation in October 1844 (for
the date, see Charles C. Gillispie, Genesis and Geology: A Study in the Relations of
Scientific Thought, Natural Theology, and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 1790–1850
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951], 163). In Lightman’s estimation, from
the time of the publication of Vestiges onward, “the evolutionary epic became one of
the most important narrative formats in the second half of the nineteenth century.”
Bernard Lightman, Victorian Popularizer of Science: Designing Nature for New Audiences
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 220–221 (for the impact of Vestiges, see
James A. Secord, Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and
Secret Authorship of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation [Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000]). The evolutionary epic continued robust in the West throughout the twentieth century. As Harvard professor E. O. Wilson describes one of its
manifestations, “the core of scientific materialism is the evolutionary epic. . . . The
evolutionary epic is probably the best myth we will ever have.” Edward O. Wilson, On
Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 201; quoted in Lightman, Victorian Popularizers of Science, 500–501. In the early part of the twenty-first
century, the evolutionary epic has remained strong as attested by recent publications
(see n. 93).
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cast about the narratives that we have in order to make it come to light.”91
Since the scope of this article does not allow for the retelling of these stories, I
suggest having these narratives in mind in order to facilitate comparison. For
the reconstruction of the modern evolutionary narrative in its non-theistic
forms, I consulted early works, such as those of Darwin,92 and more recent
publications from various fields: cosmology, geology, paleontology, and
biology.93 In general, the information presented in these works is available
to students with a secondary education, but the average reader may not be
91

Allen and Springsted, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 235.

While Darwin—a deist turned agnostic—is not representative of strictly
atheistic models, given his paradigmatic role in the articulation of modern evolutionary theory (cf. Michael Ruse, “Evolution and the Idea of Social Progress,” in Alexander
and Numbers, Biology and Ideology, 262) and given the trajectories of his narrative
strategies leading to either theistic evolution or atheism (as Lustig puts it, “all of his
[Darwin’s] rhetoric [in the Origin of Species], all of his narratives, are designed to
demonstrate the nonexistence, or at least the non-necessity, of God as a proximate cause
of the historical development of living things”; see Abigail Lustig, “Natural Atheology,” in Darwinian Heresies, ed. Abigail Lustig, Robert J. Richards, and Michael Ruse
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 75), attention to his work is necessary here and elsewhere in this article. For an assessment of the narrative strategies
in Darwin’s Origin of Species, see also David J. Depew, “The Rhetoric of the Origin
of Species,” in Ruse and Richards, Cambridge Companion to the “Origin of Species,”
237–255; Richards, “The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology,”
19–53; Helen P. Liepman, “The Six Editions of the ‘Origin of Species,’” Acta Biotheoretica 30.3 (1981): 199–214.
92

I consulted the following works, among others: Jim Baggott, Origins: The
Scientific Story of Creation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); David Christian,
Origin Story: A Big History of Everything (New York: Little, Brown and Company,
2018); Robert M. Hazen, The Story of Earth: The First 4.5 Billion Years, from Stardust to
Living Planet (New York: Penguin, 2012); Norriss S. Hetherington, ed., Encyclopedia
of Cosmology: Historical, Philosophical, and Scientific Foundations of Modern Cosmology
(New York: Garland, 1993); John Grotzinger and Thomas H. Jordan, Understanding
Earth, 6th ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman, 2010); Martin J. S. Rudwick, Earth’s Deep
History: How It Was Discovered and Why It Matters (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2014); Angeles G. Guerrero and Peter Frances, eds., Prehistoric Life (New York:
DK Publishing, 2009); Alice Roberts, ed., Evolution: The Human Story, 2nd ed. (New
York: DK Publishing, 2018); Steve Parker, ed., Evolution: The Whole Story (Buffalo,
NY: Firefly, 2015); Jerry A. Coyne, Why Evolution Is True (New York: Penguin, 2009);
Edward J. Larson, Evolution: The Remarkable History of a Scientific Theory (New
York: Modern Library, 2004); Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 25th
anniversary ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). I do not claim that
these authors are atheists. They may, perhaps, represent a wide spectrum of positions
between theism and atheism. However, I went through their works because, in them,
I could find explanations of purely naturalistic evolutionary models (whether the
naturalistic viewpoint was ontological or methodological I did not determine).
93
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able to perceive some details, variables, and difficulties of the evolutionary
story through a surface reading. Nitecki’s assessment summarizes some of the
challenges one may encounter:
There are many interpretations of evolutionary history and human
history. . . . The data to support paleontological interpretations of
history as either gradual or catastrophic are still controversial. . . .
Events narrated in history and in evolution do not necessarily correspond to the real events occurring in history or in nature. Instead,
both are based on models. Our models about evolution reflect
our political-social milieu . . . no intellectual discipline escapes
the impact and delusions of its own time. . . . Both evolutionary
biology and history are equally subjective activities because both are
influenced by the training and social standing of their respective
practitioners. . . . We must beware of not confusing the model with
the reality. . . . Paleontology, geography, or cosmology certainly tell
stories. . . . The historian gathers extant fragments of past events and
imaginatively rebuilds those events. . . . The evolutionist, such as
the paleontologist, does precisely the same. . . . The methodologies
of general history and evolutionary biology are homologous. . . .
Both seem to be involved in the construction of narratives based on
historical artefacts, necessitating the interpretation of their significance and the synthesis of these into an explanatory narrative.94
Despite these difficulties, as one surveys the literature, some trends emerge
that allow for the construction of a broad mental model of the atheistic evolutionary narrative.
Concerning the biblical story, I tried to rely on the narrative available in
the common canonical core on its own terms.95 However, given the length
and scale of the biblical narrative, it may be overwhelming as a starting point
for those who are not familiar with it. In such cases, I suggest some literature
Matthew H. Nitecki, “History: La Grande Illusion,” in Nitecki and Nitecki,
History and Evolution, 4–6, partially quoted in Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology, 68.
94

My understanding of the narrative found in the common canonical core cannot
be equated with the biblical narrative itself. My reading is necessarily limited, deficient,
and provisional. However, I intend, as much as possible, to focus on the biblical narrative as the source for the sequence of events as well as for its embedded assumptions,
as far as those can be perceived. In this I attempt to follow Osborne’s hermeneutical
spiral. See Grant R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction
to Biblical Interpretation, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 22.
I am also aware that my assessment is influenced by my own Protestant/Seventh-day
Adventist tradition. Hence, I am open to revising and nuancing my reading in the
future as others point out to me better ways to understand the BN.
95
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as a minimum basis for understanding the story.96
Data Interpretation through Both Models
The thesis I am working with throughout this article is that worldviews97 have
a significant, though not absolute, controlling effect on the interpretation of
data.98 That is, while people may have access to the same data about reality
because their interpretations are guided by and filtered through a controlling story (or stories), they will at times arrive at different conclusions when
they subscribe to different controlling stories.99 With this in mind, I will now
examine a few100 of the crucial issues about reality in light of the two grand
narratives I compare in this article—atheistic evolutionary models (AEMs)
and the biblical narrative (BN)—and then mention some possible minimal
outlooks from each perspective.101 The results from my assessment of AEMs
and the BN seem to fall into three possible categories: compatible, partially
compatible, and incompatible.102
For a concise summary of the BN, see Wilkens and Sanford, Hidden Worldviews,
183–205 (“The Contours of a Christian Worldview”). For a book-length summary,
see Bartholomew and Goheen, The Drama of Scripture. For an important complement to these works related to the problem of evil, see John C. Peckham, Theodicy of
Love: Cosmic Conflict and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018),
especially chapters 3–5.
96

This thesis might work for worldviews in any sense. In this article, however, I
focus on the discussion of worldviews in their midrange meaning—as grand stories—
because as such they provide the most comprehensive available basis to understand
the phenomenon.
97

My proposal is close to Rau’s thesis, that “although everyone has access to the
same evidence, the presuppositions implicit in a person’s philosophy determine the
perspective from which he or she views the data, leading to different logical conclusions about which explanation best fits the evidence.” Mapping the Origins Debate, 20.
98

99
People who subscribe to different controlling stories may interpret data in a
similar way and may arrive at similar conclusions. In fact, this happens often. As Tom
Goodwin puts it, “Many interpretations of data can be widely shared across individuals with different worldviews” (email to author, 22 April 2019). Thus, the controlling
effect is relative to one’s exposure to conflicting data, openness to better explanations,
and engagement in critical reflection.
100

Due to the constraints of space, I limited the discussion to nine issues.

Admittedly, these issues would be better investigated with a full essay each, but
here, I modestly cover these topics with some general patterns that hopefully will be
sufficient for the purposes of this article.
101

102
The authors listed in the discussion below do not necessarily subscribe to the
positions I advocate in this article. They are listed in association with these discussions
because their works are compatible with the arguments I present in their immediate
context.
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Compatible
Age of the Universe
AEMs currently estimate the age of the universe at close to 14 billion years.103
While the BN does not specify a precise period since the creation of the
cosmos, it is compatible with an old universe.104 Genesis 1:1 states that “God
created” the universe (“the heavens”) “in the beginning.” Furthermore, while
describing the earth as having been created along with the universe (Gen 1:1),
the BN explains that the earth remained “without form and void” (Gen 1:2)
for an undetermined duration until it was later organized and fashioned with
life (Gen 1:3–2:3). Thus, the narrative is compatible with an old cosmos that
could far predate the creation of life on earth.105 This is further supported
by other passages in the BN, such as Job 38:4–7, which mentions “all God’s
children”106 (v. 7), i.e., other rational nonhuman beings, witnessing the subsequent organization of earth and creation of life on it with celebration and joy.
The scene may imply the existence of a universe, along with other intelligent
beings, anteceding the time humans appeared on earth.
Partially Compatible
Reality Perception
Though the issue of reality perception can be nuanced within models and
across different areas of inquiry, in general, AEMs and the BN acknowledge
an objectively real cosmos that can be studied and understood.107 These narra103
See Grotzinger and Jordan, Understanding Earth, 216; Hazen, The Story of
Earth, 7; Baggott, Origins, 9; Christian, Origin Story, 13.
104
Biblical theists are divided on the issue of the age of the universe. Some argue
for a young universe, mostly based on an isolated reading of Genesis 1–2, while others
think of an old universe through a harmonizing reading of Genesis with current deep
time cosmology. I also favor an old age for the cosmos, but arrive at it by a different
route: namely, an integrative reading of Genesis with other creation texts in the BN,
i.e., a canonical, narrative reading of biblical creation texts. See more below.

I am following the “Passive-gap A view” here, i.e., “old universe (including
earth)” and “young life (on earth),” as described in Richard M. Davidson, “The
Genesis Account of Origins,” in The Genesis Creation Account and Its Reverberations in
the Old Testament, ed. Gerald A. Klingbeil (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 2015), 59–129. See also Randall W. Younker, God’s Creation: Exploring the
Genesis Story (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 1999), 28–36; Harold G. Coffin, Robert H.
Brown, and L. James Gibson, Origin by Design, rev. ed. (Hagerstown, MD: Review
and Herald, 2005), 34.
105

106

Author’s translation of kol-bene ’elohim.

In this assessment I assume critical realism, which “posits an objectively existing world and the possibility of trustworthy knowledge of it, but also recognizes the
prejudice that inevitably accompanies human knowing and demands an ongoing
107
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tives differ, however, in their level of confidence as to how much of reality
can be perceived and adequately interpreted. AEMs tend to operate under
the assumption that reality is adequately perceived through human senses
and that presently observable phenomena accurately point to past realities.
The BN, on the other hand, while attempting to depict the real world, also
emphasizes a complex reality that is not sufficiently apprehended by our
senses (e.g., God, angels, evil spirits, and so on are not ordinarily perceived).
Our knowledge of reality, in this view, is incomplete. Also, the BN depicts
humans and nature in a fallen condition that does not represent the original
state of creation. Thus, the present status of reality cannot be safely extrapolated into the distant past; nor is human capacity at present sufficient to know
and uncover all of reality by observation and reason alone.
Evil
Both AEMs and the BN notice a pervasive presence of violence, cruelty,
predation, waste, pain, death, and so forth in nature, but they evaluate it
differently. AEMs interpret these phenomena as typical actions in the struggle
for survival. The expectation is that these phenomena are likely to continue
indefinitely—at least as it relates to nonhuman life—and are a normal part of
reality.108 The same events are interpreted in the BN as temporary anomalies
critical conversation about the essentials of one’s outlook. . . . This position avoids the
arrogance of modernity and the despair of postmodernity.” Naugle, Worldview, 324.
108
Again (see n. 92), given Darwin’s significant contribution to shifting the
worldview of the elites from a theistic to a naturalistic spectrum (see Greene, Darwin
and the Modern World View, 10–11), his ideas are very informative. Darwin’s unbelief
in a benevolent God who interacts directly with creation does not stem so much from
his science, but mostly from the problem of evil (Brooke, “Science and Secularization,” 111; Brooke, “The Origin and the Question of Religion,” 261), observed in at
least three aspects: 1) nature, 2) personal life, and 3) his theology and personal
philosophy of life. In other words, his unbelief was “significantly motivated by nonscientific premises” and his theory was an attempt to deal with those problems. As
Hunter puts it, “Darwin’s theory of evolution was . . . a theodicy [“a solution to the
age-old problem of evil”].” See Cornelius G. Hunter, Darwin’s God: Evolution and the
Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2019),
13, 14, 16; cf. Frank M. Turner, “Darwin and Creation,” in European Intellectual
History: From Rousseau to Nietzsche, ed. Richard A. Lofthouse (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2014), 117–120; Abigail J. Lustig, “Darwin’s Difficulties,” in Ruse
and Richards, Cambridge Companion to the “Origin of Species,” 109–128; John Hedley
Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives, Canto Classics ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 431; Depew, “Rhetoric of the
Origin,” 249; Gillespie, Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation, 124–133. Regarding the first issue—evil observed in nature—Darwin could not believe that “a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created” so “much misery in the
world” seen in waste, predation, pain, and death. See Charles Darwin to Asa Gray, 22
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that result from the presence of evil in our planet. Evil challenges the soverMay 1860, in The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, ed. Francis Darwin (New York:
Appleton, 1898), 2:105, quoted in Greene, Darwin and the Modern World View, 45.
Given the problem in nature (which had been magnified through Malthusian influence; see Turner, “Darwin and Creation,” 117–120) and the inadequate responses
provided by natural theology, “Darwin solved the problem by coming up with a
natural law [natural selection] that he argued could account for evil.” “Evil was
somehow an unfortunate byproduct of the workings of those natural laws.” In this
scenario, “God [was] . . . distanced from creation and . . . therefore absolved of its evil”
(Hunter, Darwin’s God, 16–17, 121). The problem had been created by natural theology, which “ascribed nature’s wonders to the Creator,” but “tended to avoid nature’s
quandaries.” “The evil side of nature was either ignored or redefined as something
positive” by Victorian natural theologians. It represented an “overly optimistic view of
the world” that “failed to account for its evil” (Hunter, Darwin’s God, 130–131).
Darwin created a solution that took evil seriously. While his solution did not, in fact,
solve the problem of evil, it offered a more realistic and, in some sense, more satisfying
explanation than the one offered by natural theology at the time (though Darwin
himself was not fully satisfied with it either; see Turner, “Darwin and Creation,” 119).
For a contemporary proposal for the problem of evil that is compatible with the biblical narrative, see Peckham, Theodicy of Love, esp. chs. 3–6. On the second issue that
troubled Darwin—evil experienced in personal life—it is important to have in mind
at least two dimensions: Darwin’s extremely poor health and the great losses he went
through in the nearly two decades prior to the publication of the Origin of Species. His
son Francis stated that “for nearly forty years [Darwin] never knew one day of the
health of ordinary men, and thus his life was one long struggle against the weariness
and strain of sickness” (quoted in Wudan Yan, “Charles Darwin Was One Sick Dude,”
Jstor Daily, 12 February 2016, https://daily.jstor.org/charles-darwin-was-one-sickdude/). Darwin lost “his third child in 1842 and . . . his beloved Annie in 1851”
(Brooke, “Darwin’s Science and His Religion,” 62; see also the detailed assessment of
James R. Moore, “Of Love and Death: Why Darwin ‘Gave Up Christianity,’” in
Moore, History, Humanity and Evolution, 195–229). Darwin also lost his father in
1848; see Nora Barlow, ed., The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809–1882
(London: Collins, 1958), 117n3, available at John van Wyhe, ed., “The Complete
Work of Charles Darwin Online,” http://darwin-online.org.uk. These losses were
aggravated by the third problem—Darwin’s view of God. Besides other theological
views discussed in this paper, Darwin wrestled with the traditional/medieval doctrine
of hell—which significantly impinges on the character of God—and feared that the
concept of eternal torment “would include . . . [his] Father, Brother and almost all . . .
[his] best friends” (Barlow, Autobiography, 87, quoted in Moore, “Why Darwin ‘Gave
Up Christianity,’” 197). Interestingly, this was not his wife’s view. Emma, who was a
devout Christian, did not believe in the traditional view of hell and annotated Darwin’s
Autobiography saying that “nothing can be said too severe upon the doctrine of
everlasting punishment.” She also added her perception of their immediate cultural
and religious context: “but very few now would call that [everlasting punishment for
disbelief ] ‘Christianity’” (Barlow, Autobiography, 87n1, quoted in Moore, “Why
Darwin ‘Gave Up Christianity,’” 203). For the available theological options on this
issue at the time of Darwin, see Geoffrey Rowell, Hell and the Victorians: A Study of the

Worldviews: Concepts or Narratives?

293

eignty of God and has caused structural modifications in nature, not present
in the original creation.109 These problems are expected to be eliminated as
God carries out his redemptive plan. Its completion includes the destruction
of evil and the renewal of the earth.
Nineteenth-Century Theological Controversies concerning Eternal Punishment and the
Future Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), ch. 7 (cited in Moore, “Why Darwin
‘Gave Up Christianity’,” 226n18) and Brooke, Science and Religion, Canto Classics
ed., 419. In Moore’s estimation, “Darwin had stuck at an outmoded version of Christianity” (203). In this I concur with Ruse, “Biography after biography of the
nineteenth- and twentieth-century believers show that what led to non-belief was
theological not scientific.” Michael Ruse, “Atheism, Naturalism, and Science,” in
Harrison, Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, 236 (cf. Brooke, “The Origin
and the Question of Religion,” 261–262). The traditional doctrine of eternal torment
is dependent upon a specific understanding of human nature, namely, that humans
are or have an eternal soul. For a present articulation of human nature that fits the
biblical narrative, see Richard M. Davidson, “The Nature of the Human Being from
the Beginning: Genesis 1–11,” in “What Are Human Beings That Your Remember
Them?”: Proceedings of the Third International Bible Conference; Nof Ginosar and Jerusalem, June 11–21, 2012, ed. Clinton Wahlen (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research
Institute, 2015), 11–42. In the same volume, see also Félix H. Cortez, “Death and
Future Hope in the Hebrew Bible,” 95–106; Félix H. Cortez, “Death and Hell in the
New Testament,” 183–204; Jiří Moskala, “Eternal Punishment in Hell and the
Immortality of the Soul: Overview of the Current Debate,” 293–305. For other
important works on this issue, see Joel B. Green, “The Strange Case of the Vanishing
Soul,” in The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, ed. Jonathan J. Loose, Angus
J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018), 427–438; Christopher M. Date, Gregory G. Stump, and Joshua W. Anderson, Rethinking Hell:
Readings in Evangelical Conditionalism (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014). Finally, Charles
Darwin’s theology and personal philosophy were influenced by the beliefs of others:
his grandfather’s (Erasmus’s) distrust of divine revelation, his father’s (Robert’s)
unbelief, John Sterling’s and Francis Newman’s distrust of biblical religion via German
criticism (Moore, “Why Darwin ‘Gave up Christianity’,” 204, 212–216), David
Hume’s skepticism, Auguste Comte’s positivism (Edward Manier, The Young Darwin
and His Cultural Circle, Studies in the History of Modern Science 2 [Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel, 1978], 24, 40–47, 86–89, quoted in Brooke, “Darwin’s Science
and His Religion,” 61; while somewhat disagreeing with Manier’s assessment, Brooke
states significantly that the influence of “Hume and Comte together might be thought
to constitute an overkill!” [61]), his brother Erasmus’s atheism, and Harriet Martineau’s association and “her circle of heterodox intellectuals,” to name a few (Brooke,
“Darwin’s Science and His Religion,” 61; Brooke, “Science and Secularization,” 111).
These, along with other influences not mentioned here, seem to have interacted synergistically with Charles Darwin’s suffering and theology, leading him on a path from
cultural theism to agnostic skepticism.
Failure to consider the structural modifications in nature that result from
the Fall radically decontextualizes the biblical story and makes it unintelligible. For a
helpful treatment of this issue, see Peckham, Theodicy of Love.
109
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Trajectory
Evolutionary thinking flourished in an unprecedented way during modernity, a period marked by a focus on progress. Historically, this focus was first
observed sociologically (technological advances, industrial revolution, colonial
expansion, economic flourishing, etc.) and then extrapolated into biological speculations.110 This upward trajectory has always been foundational for
AEMs to be accepted by the general public.111 The BN, on the other hand,
while compatible with progress in the sense of the accumulation of empirical
knowledge and its active and intentional use (technological progress) for the
well-being of humans and nature at large, points to a moral and biological downward trajectory since humanity departed from God’s benign rule.
Moreover, while the BN calls humans toward restoration (a form of progress)
on all levels—personal, interpersonal, and environmental—to mitigate the
effects of this descent, ultimately, in this narrative, the situation will only be
remedied by God’s own intervention. Thus, while both narratives may be
compatible with technological progress, at present, the imagery they project
onto the general public has opposing trajectories for moral and biological
mobility (AEMs upward vs. BN downward).112

Cf. Michael Ruse, Darwinism as Religion: What Literature Tells Us about Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1–3, 9–11, 18, 29.
110

After the 1930s, however, with the progress of Mendelian genetics, professional biologists moved away from social considerations (such as progress) in order to
turn evolutionary biology into a scientifically respectable discipline. This led to a sharp
decline in the use of the idea of progress in technical works (popular works, however,
have continued to use and intertwine the notions of social, cultural, and biological
progress). Interestingly, these professional biologists, while silent about progress in
their technical works, for the most part, have remained personally committed to the
idea of progress. See Ruse, “Evolution and the Idea of Progress,” 247–275.
111

112
Due to the catastrophic events of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (WWI, WWII, the Holocaust, mass genocides in the USSR and China, 9/11,
ISIS, etc.), the sociological perception of progress has become ambiguous, with many
rejecting the notion. As a result, some question if AEMs will continue to appeal as an
explanation for the development of life once the foundational sociological perception
of progress, which led to the quick acceptance of Darwinism, is mostly out of the
picture. See “The Rise and Fall of Progress” in Tom Bethell, Darwin’s House of Cards
(Seattle: Discovery Institute Press, 2017), 247–257.
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Incompatible113
God
The existence of a personal Creator who is other than creation, along with the
participation of that Being in the affairs of the cosmos, is likely the point on
which AEMs and the BN are most different. While AEMs tend to conceive
reality as something that originated and came to its present status through
natural means, the BN is explicit about divine agency and identity in the
By incompatible I do not claim incompatibility between science and religion,
but between the two grand stories discussed in this article, which inform and largely
condition one’s science and religion. Looking back at historical junctures of potential
incompatibility since the nineteenth century, we notice some significant actors and
trends. The people I mention below were not necessarily representative of these grand
stories and did not cause such tensions in isolation, but acted as parts of sociological
trends too large to analyze in this article. They are mentioned here for their influential
roles in those trends in their historical and cultural periods and their impact in the
interpretation of these two grand stories. Besides the significant philosophical shifts
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mentioned earlier (see n. 90), tensions
between these two metanarratives were aggravated in the nineteenth century by
many agents and trends. One of these was Charles Lyell and his uniformitarianism
and professionalization of geology. Geology had, to a large degree, previously been
marked by incompetence, anti-intellectual attitudes, and nominal attachment to the
Genesis flood, i.e., early geologists, while subscribing to a belief in the flood and using
the concept in their explanations, in practice indulged in wild speculations greatly
departing from the biblical narrative (compare early flood geologists’ explanations in
Gillispie, Genesis and Geology, 41–72 with the biblical narrative; see also pp. 89–90
for the state of affairs just prior to Lyell’s Principles of Geology). In his efforts to professionalize the nascent discipline, Lyell sought to define the limits of inquiry within
uniformitarianism (following James Hutton in a much more robust and thorough
fashion). Since the biblical flood account was incompatible with his uniformitarian
assumption, Lyell also “thought it necessary to rewrite the history of geology as though
every path of inquiry in the science had been blocked repeatedly with Noah’s ark,”
thus making it appear unprofessional and unscientific to use the Genesis flood as an
explanation (quote from James R. Moore, “Geologists and Interpreters of Genesis in
the Nineteenth Century,” in God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between
Christianity and Science, ed. David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers [Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1986], 328, emphasis added, inference mine;
for further nuance, see Moore). As Radick puts it, Lyell “saw his books [Principles of
Geology] as an attempt to expunge biblical religion from geology” (Gregory Radick, “Is
the Theory of Natural Selection Independent of Its History?” in Hodge and Radick,
Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 163).
113
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process. As one of the three core elements in one’s worldview, the concept of
While Lyell’s erudite anti-catastrophism was an effective attempt to discredit the
global flood described in Genesis as a potential geological explanation, later geologists
as well as present-day scholars—while not supporting a global flood—recognize that
complete uniformitarianism cannot explain the earth’s crust, but rather acknowledge
that “the history of life and of the planet” has been shaped by “catastrophic events”
(Martin Redfern, The Earth: A Very Short Introduction [Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003], 30). For the unempirical sources of Lyell’s uniformitarianism, see
Gillespie, Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation, 59. A second agent of tension
was Auguste Comte and his positivism. Comte, who has been considered “the most
influential sociologist and philosopher of science in the Nineteeth Century” (Kenneth
S. Sacks, “Auguste Comte and Consensus Formation in American Religious
Thought—Part 1: The Creation of Consensus,” Religions 8.8 [2017]: 1), published
“between 1830 and 1842 . . . a six-volume work entitled Cours de philosophie positive”
in which he proposed a “three-stage theory of human intellectual development”—the
theological, the metaphisical, and the positive stages. Comte suggested that supernatural beliefs were part of the most primitive form of human development—the theological stage, and that the most advanced phase was the positive or scientific phase which
was not marred by metaphysical and theological considerations (see Frank M. Turner,
“Old Faiths and New,” in Lofthouse, European Intellectual History, 239–40). Within
such model Comte stated that “all real science stands in radical and necessary opposition to all theology” (quoted in Gillespie, Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation,
54). While Comtean positivism partially “lost intellectual favor” in the second half of
the nineteenth century (Henry S. Tillinghast, “Positivism,” in A Science and Religion
Primer, ed. Heidi A. Campbell and Heather Looy [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2009], 175–176) after Comte had established a “secular cult” “which he termed
Religion of Humanity” and “dubbed himself the High Priest” (Turner, “Old Faiths
and New,” 238, 241), positivistic ideas remained strong in the sciences well into the
twentieth century. They only began to lose some ground as positivist science failed to
provide convincing demarcation lines between science and pseudo-science (see Larry
Laudan, “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” in But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, ed. Michael Ruse [Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus, 1988], 337–350, quoted in Stephen C. Meyer, “Intelligent Design,” in
Four Views on Creatioon, Evolution, and Intelligent Design, ed. Stanley N. Gundry and
J. B. Stump [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017], 206n58; cf. Larry Laudan, Beyond
Positivism and Relativism: Theolory, Method, and Evidence [Boulder, CO: Westview,
1996], 23, quoted in Stathis Psillos, “Having Science in View: General Philosophy of
Science and Its Significance,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, ed. Paul
Humphreys [New York: Oxford University Press, 2016], 140). For a recent appraisal
of the demarcation question, see Stephen C. Meyer, “Sauce for the Goose: Intelligent
Design, Scientific Methodology, and the Demarcation Problem,” in The Nature of
Nature: Explaining the Role of Naturalism in Science, ed. Bruce L. Gordon and William
A. Dembski (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2011), 95–131. A third cause of tension
was the popularization of the Nebular Hypothesis (NH) among British audiences in
the 1830’s and thereafter (from 1845 onward, also American audiences largely through
the twenty American editions enjoyed by Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural
History of Creation; see James A. Secord, “Behind the Veil: Robert Chambers and
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God (which includes how such a Being is and operates) or the lack thereof
Vestiges,” in Moore, History, Humanity and Evolution, 166). The NH attempted to
explain the origin and development of the solar system through natural means. Its
advocates, like Herbert Spencer, contrasted the “mythic” idea of divine creation “with
the eminent pedigree of the nebular hypothesis—Immanuel Kant, William Herschel
and Pierre Laplace.” Legitimacy for the theory was also sought by associating it to the
prestigious science of astronomy, though such link was precarious. Other advocates
would specifically interpret the NH against the Christian story. Phrenologist George
Combe, for instance, understood the NH as promoted by John Pringle Nichol, as
“invaluable in a high degree as a means of destroying superstition,” which Schaffer
explains as referring to “the implausibility of Christ’s incarnation” (see Simon Schaffer,
“The Nebular Hypothesis and the Science of Progress,” in Moore, History, Humanity
and Evolution, 131–164). Promoted at a time in which progress was a high value, the
NH was culturally extremely successful. As Philip Lawrence puts it, “the nebular
hypothesis caught the imaginations of almost all thinking men and strongly influenced the form of scientific and historical explanations they were willing to entertain”
(“Heaven and Earth—The Relation of the Nebular Hypothesis to Geology,” in
Cosmology, History and Theology, ed. Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck [New
York: Plenum, 1977], 279, quoted in Stephen G. Brush, “The Nebular Hypothesis
and the Evolutionary Worldview,” History of Science 25 [1987]: 245). A fourth agent
who raised tensions between these two metanarratives was Charles Darwin and his
naturalism against special creations. As Gillespie puts it, “the Origin [of Species] was, in
effect, a manifesto for positivist science. As such, the Origin was profoundly incompatible with special creation” (Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation, 66). Evidently,
Darwin’s Origin was in tension with the BN, which describes a type of special creation.
The caveat, however, is that Darwin’s attack was on the notion of divine special
creation of individual species through time—an idea put forward by natural theologians, but not by the biblical narrative. In other words, the attack was on the cultural
(not biblical) view of special creation. For other Darwinian challenges to the BN, see
Brooke, Science and Religion, Canto Classics ed., 383. A fifth agent was Thomas
Huxley, who, along with “the young guard of science,” directed systematic efforts to
exclude religious scientists from the practice of professional science and from participating in scientific societies (see “The Victorian Conflict between Science and
Religion: A Professional Dimension,” in Turner, Contesting Cultural Authorities,
171–200). Stanley concludes that “the scientific naturalists’ . . . victory in removing
theism from the expectations and parlance of the scientific community had little to do
with how science was done (despite their claims to the contrary) and much more to do
with attempting to secure better access to professional positions, resources, and
cultural authority.” Matthew Stanley, “Where Naturalism and Theism Met: The
Uniformity of Nature,” in Victorian Scientific Naturalism: Community, Identity, Continuity, ed. Gowan Dawson and Bernard Lightman (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2014), 257–258. Huxley, in particular, “adopted the polemical strategy of
asserting that virtually any criticism stemmed from religious sources and consequently
played up any and all religious criticism. . . . By linking any opposition to evolution . . .
with the religious criticism, Huxley simply practiced the tactic of guilt or, in this case,
incompetent obscurantism by association. Any opponent of Darwin had to be opposing the great man for religious reasons. In this regard, the image and metaphor of a
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profoundly impacts how one perceives reality and, thus, how one goes about
life, including one’s science.114

necessary conflict between science and religion was of immense polemical advantage
to [non-religious] scientists. Since Huxley wrote one of the earliest accounts of the
reception of the Origin of Species, on which, until the 1960s, most other later accounts
were based, the image of scientific light against religious darkness prevailed in our
understanding of the reception of Darwin’s theory” (Turner, “Darwin and Creation,”
103–104). A sixth cause of increased tension was the publication of John William
Draper’s History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874) and Andrew
Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom
(1896), which promoted the conflict thesis based on “personal reasons” against “ecclesiastical authority” (Brooke, “Darwin and Victorian Christianity,” 213; cf. Brooke,
“Science and Secularization,” 107). While poorly representative of the relationships
between science and religion even then, Draper’s and White’s military metaphors
unfortunately continued to influence, shape, and distort later historical discussions on
the relationship of science and religion (for details and the need to discard the military
metaphors in the dialogue between science and religion, see James R. Moore, The
Post-Darwinian Controversies: A Study of the Protestant Struggle to Come to Terms with
Darwin in Great Britain and America 1870–1900 [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979], 19–100). In this regard, I agree with Gillespie’s assessment, that “scientific popularizer John Fiske was impressively correct when he scolded . . . Draper,
saying that the real conflict was not between science and religion, but between two
systems of science” (Gillespie, Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation, 18).
114
As a paradigmatic example of the effects of one’s understanding of God on
one’s worldview, it is helpful to be aware of Darwin’s own views of God and how
they shaped the articulation of his evolutionary theory. See Stephen Dilley, “Charles
Darwin’s Use of Theology in the Origin of Species,” British Society for the History of
Science 45.1 (2011): 29–56. Dilley shows how Darwin used two kinds of theology
to serve his rhetorical purposes: an “Enlightenment-style theology” to “enhance
the credibility of his argument or theory” and a “reductio theology” through which
Darwin attempted to “reduce their [creationists’] theology to an absurdity . . . by
showing that it was at odds with the facts of nature,” thus discrediting them. Dilley
concludes that “reductio theology forms a crucial part of Darwin’s argument for
evolution” (30–31). Hunter makes essentially the same point: “The strength of . . .
[Darwin’s] argument [against design] lies in its implicit rebuke of divine creation. . . .
Negative theology was a consistent theme for Darwin” (Darwin’s God, 46–47). See also
Paul A. Nelson, “The Role of Theology in Current Evolutionary Reasoning,” Biology
and Philosophy 11 (1996): 493–517, cited in Lustig, “Natural Atheology,” 69–83. For
a recent example within AEMs of how one’s view of God influences one’s worldview,
see Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006). For
contrary views, see Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath, The Dawkins
Delusion?: Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2007) and David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its
Scientific Pretensions (New York: Basic Books, 2009).
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Origin and Age of Life on Earth
In AEMs, the origin of life must be interpreted without resorting to any supernatural cause.115 Accordingly, the origin of life is considered spontaneous,116
even though this proposal is not derived from empirical data,117 but from a
prior philosophical commitment to methodological naturalism.118 Likewise,
from the perspective of the BN, life is understood as originating from the
intentional action of the Creator, something that similarly cannot be observed.
115
As Reiss puts it, “The scientific worldview is materialistic in the sense that it is
neither idealistic nor admits of non-physical explanations.” Michael J. Reiss, “Imagining the World: The Significance of Religious Worldviews for Science Education,” in
Matthews, Science, Worldviews and Education, 138.
116

Baggott, Origins, 202–203.

“Never, in the entire history of science, has life ever been observed to spring
from anything other than life.” Baggott, Origins, 203. Rupke speaks of “the embarrassing fact that, until the present day, we have not solved this fundamental problem of
organic origins. We neither know how life began nor have we succeeded in reproducing in the laboratory the processes that during primeval times led—one assumes—to
abiogenesis.” Nicolaas Rupke, “Darwin’s Choice,” in Alexander and Numbers, Biology
and Ideology, 161. “To be perfectly frank, we don’t know exactly how such organic
chemicals began behaving like living organisms, or how they developed cellular
complexity.” Ian Tattersall, Paleontology: A Brief History of Life (West Conshohocken,
PA: Templeton Press, 2010), 45.
117

From a historical perspective, Larson observes that “commitment to methodological naturalism in science made the acceptance of evolution in biology virtually
inevitable” (Evolution, 51). Dilley notes that “methodological naturalism . . . [was]
an increasingly pervasive view of science among biologists during Darwin’s era” and
that “it was Darwin’s adherence to this method—more than his extensive empirical
evidence—that helped his theory win converts” (“Darwin’s Use of Theology,” 35n29;
Dilley attributes the thought in the latter quote to Ronald Numbers). At present, this
method retains very strong support: “Methodological naturalism . . . lays down which
sort of study qualifies as scientific.” Ernan McMullin, “Plantinga’s Defense of Special
Creation,” Christian Scholar’s Review 21.1 (September 1991): 56. “Science neither
denies or opposes the supernatural, but ignores the supernatural for methodological
reasons.” Eugene C. Scott, “Darwin Prosecuted: Review of Johnson’s Darwin on Trial,”
Creation Evolution Journal 13.2 (1993). Both sources quoted in Alvin Plantinga, Where
the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 170. Menuge makes an important observation about this issue: “If MN
[methodological naturalism] is restricted to standard operations of science, which uses
an inductive method to investigate repeatable connections between secondary causes
(as typical in a chemistry experiment), few will object to it. . . . However, MN is highly
controversial when applied to historical science, which attempts to infer the best explanation of a singular event or state of affairs. This is particularly clear when historical
science investigates questions of ultimate origins, like the origins of the universe, life,
biological information, consciousness, and morality.” Angus J. L. Menuge, “Methodological Naturalism,” in Copan et al., Dictionary of Christianity and Science, 438.
118
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Both are based on a priori philosophical commitments. AEMs require deep
time for the origin and subsequent development of life,119 while the BN seems
to suggest a much more recent time scale for these processes.120
Complexity of Life
When looking at the complexity of life through AEMs, one has to find
solely naturalistic explanations for the phenomenon. The evolutionary
story, through its combination of factors such as deep time,121 advantageous mutations,122 natural selection,123 descent with modification, gradual
For concerns about the sufficiency of the current evolutionary time scale, see
“So Little Time for Everything” in Ariel Roth, Science Discovers God: Seven Convincing Lines of Evidence for His Existence (Hagerstown, MD: Autumn House, 2008),
131–158.
119

120
Many, especially in the theistic evolution spectrum, interpret the BN as
compatible with longer time scales for the origin and development of life. Such
positions require the syncretism of the BN with the evolutionary story. For an elaboration of such models, see Bishop et al., Understanding Scientific Theories of Origins.
121
From the evolutionary perspective, “the recognition of the Earth’s deep history
was a necessary precondition for any satisfactory explanation of the diversity of living
organisms, and particularly of the origin of our own species” (emphasis added).
Rudwick, Earth’s Deep History, 3. As the Nobel laureate George Wald once said, “Time
is in fact the hero of the [evolutionary] plot. . . . time itself performs the miracles.”
“The Origen of Life,” Scientific American 191.2 (1954): 48, quoted in David Catchpoole, “Time is the Hero,” Creation 34.3 (2012): 6.

See Masatoshi Nei, Mutation-Driven Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013). For limits to what mutations can do, see Michael J. Behe, The Edge of
Evolution: The Search for the Limits of Darwinism (New York: Free Press, 2007) and
Douglas Axe, Undeniable: How Biology Confirms Our Intuition That Life Is Designed
(New York: HarperOne, 2016).
122

123
Mayr’s historical assessment on how natural selection moved from a “minority
opinion” to “the prevailing explanation of evolutionary change” is insightful. He states,
“It must be admitted, however, that it [natural selection] has achieved this position less
by the amount of irrefutable proofs it has been able to present than by the default of
all opposing theories.” Ernst Mayr, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1988), 170, quoted in Hunter, Darwin’s God, 64. Roberts
adds, “The factor that proved most decisive in accounting for the conversion of those
scientists [natural historians, “during the decade after 1865”] was neither their belief
that Darwin succeeded in providing a mechanism that could plausibly account for
transmutation nor a dramatic influx of data favourable to an evolutionary interpretation of the history of life. Rather, the paramount consideration was meta-empirical:
a conviction that transmutation was more consistent with the norms of scientific
discourse than was the ‘dogma of special creations’.” Jon H. Roberts, “Religious
Reactions to Darwin,” in Harrison, Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion,
87 (emphasis added). For a representative view of natural selection within current
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development,124 and so forth, provides the conceptual framework to explain
complexity through an unplanned and unguided process.125 Through the
BN, complexity is interpreted as the result of the action of a Designer who
engineered complex systems into being126 and provided them with ample
room for adaptation127 to different environments.
Relationships
Because AEMs do not conceive of realities beyond the one presently observed,
from this perspective, there can be no personal relationship beyond the ones
we experience with fellow human beings. Besides, interhuman relations tend
to be broadly framed in the context of competition (for survival, advance-

AEMs, see Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: Norton, 1986). For
a contemporary critique of the effectiveness of this mechanism, see Michael J. Behe,
Darwin Devolves: The New Science about DNA that Challenges Evolution (New York:
HarperOne, 2019). For the growing skepticism within the scientific community
about the sufficiency of random mutations and natural selection for the Darwinian
evolutionary paradigm, see updated list available at dissentfromdarwin.org/download.
124
Douglas H. Erwin and Robert L. Anstey, “Speciation in the Fossil Record,”
in New Approaches to Speciation in the Fossil Record, ed. Douglas H. Erwin and Robert
L. Anstey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 11–38. For problems with
gradualism in the fossil record, see Stephen C. Meyer, Darwin’s Doubt: The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design (New York: HarperOne,
2013); David Klinghoffer, ed., Debating Darwin’s Doubt (Seattle: Discovery Institute
Press, 2015).
125
Cf. Brian and Deborah Charlesworth, Evolution: A Very Short Introduction,
rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1. Coyne explains evolution with
“six components,” namely, “evolution, gradualism, speciation, common ancestry,
natural selection, and non-selective mechanisms of evolutionary change.” Why Evolution Is True, 4.
126
Cf. Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: Free Press, 1996); Stephen C. Meyer, Signature in the Cell: DNA and
the Evidence for Intelligent Design (New York: HarperOne, 2009); David Klinghoffer,
ed., Signature of Controversy: Responses to Critiques of Signature in the Cell (Seattle:
Discovery Institute Press, 2010).

The expression ample room for adaptation here does not encompass extrapolation to macroevolution. It refers simply to microevolution. The fixity of species
overthrown by evolutionary thinking dates “not from time immemorial but rather
from late eighteenth century.” Frank M. Taylor, “Nature Historicised,” in Lofthouse,
European Intellectual History, 88. For a biblical appraisal of the issue, see A. Rahel
Davidson Schafer, “The ‘Kinds’ of Genesis 1: What Is the Meaning of Mîn?,” JATS
14.1 (2003): 86–100. For a helpful short discussion on the issue of the fixity of species,
see Hunter, Darwin’s God, 61–64.
127
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ment, etc.).128 The BN, on the other hand, describes creation in relational
terms:129 humans harmoniously relating to other humans, and humans in
direct relationship with God. And while the BN acknowledges disruption in
all those relationships at the Fall, it also describes God initiating reconciliation
right then.130 It further indicates that, while such reconciliation is possible at
present, it will reach complete fulfillment in the renewed earth. Moreover,
even though the human-divine relationship is limited at present, it can be
intimate and positive. Finally, interpersonal relations in this perspective are
framed in the context of one family, in which each member is responsible
not only for him/herself but also for the well-being of other members of the
human family.131
Death
AEMs consider the present cycle of mortality as normal, that is, as part of
the unchanging regularity of human reality.132 The BN, on the other hand,
while also recognizing the pattern of mortality in the present order, affirms
that death is a temporary anomaly in the system—one that will be destroyed133
and reversed,134 in due time, as part of God’s redemptive plan for the human
family.
Conclusion
Worldviews are very significant because, to a great extent, they direct people’s
existence; and yet, most people are often unaware of the many influences that
attempt to steer their lives. Thus, one of the goals of this article is to invite
people to reflect on their worldviews and become aware of the forces that
impinge on their recognition of reality and their decision-making processes.136
135

128
It seems true that many self-labeled atheists are altruistic and operate in an
attitude of cooperation. Conversely, it also seems true that many professed biblical
theists are selfish and function with an attitude of competition. This raises the issue of
consistency with one’s respective story.
129

See Goheen and Bartholomew, Living at the Crossroads, 33–34.

130

See Genesis 3:8–13.

131

See, for instance, Luke 10:25–37.

While AEMs committed to ontological naturalism consider death the end
of human existence, AEMs committed merely to methodological naturalism may be
open to some kind of spiritual continuity of life after death.
132

133

Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:26.

134

Cf. John 11:24–25; Acts 3:20–21; 1 Corinthians 15:20–24; Philippians 3:11.

Whenever the expression worldview(s) is used in an unqualified way in this
conclusion, it refers to worldviews in a maximal sense.
135

136

Though using different wording, Ante Jerončić made similar points in his
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In order to achieve this aim, I have suggested that while a priori commitments
(macro-hermeneutical assumptions) deeply affect one’s worldview,137 they are
not sufficient to account for one’s view of reality.138 Those commitments are
better understood in relationship with the dynamic framework of a controlling story (or stories), whose function I illustrated through the operating
system metaphor. The controlling function was further demonstrated by
comparing some interpretations of data through the frameworks of atheistic
evolutionary models and the biblical narrative. While such controlling stories
(or software) do not exhaust one’s worldview—since other factors in one’s
experience also contribute to the total picture—they provide a beneficial and
relatively broad starting point to assess different views of life.
In light of the information shared in this article, I suggest a few concluding remarks about worldviews. First, worldview development can be healthier
when people are aware of the stories influencing them and take an active and
intentional role in understanding, accepting, challenging, or rejecting these
stories or parts of them.
A second consideration is that for an assessment in this area to be fair and
legitimate; it must, as much as possible, take into account the assessed story’s
full narrative structure and internal cohesion. Each claim must be evaluated
from within each narrative’s own internal logic and particular assumptions.
Analyzing worldview claims from the outside—from a different narrative
and different assumptions—prevents adequate understanding because they
are decontextualized. Moreover, superficial engagement is not enough to
effectively compare, contrast, and critique worldviews; more in-depth study
and broad-mindedness are necessary to process information from different
narratives, along with their presuppositions.
Third, when there is willingness, openness, and desire to learn, it can
be helpful to share these grand narratives with people who subscribe to
different controlling stories. This process can promote dialogue and mutual
understanding. As Allen and Springsted put it, “To the degree that we share
narratives, we share understanding; and to the degree that there is no sharing,
there is the same degree of incomprehension.”139 It seems that the search for
presentation “What Worldview Discourse (Over)Promises: Some Anthropological
Considerations” (paper presented at “Transforming Worldview(s): Biblical Faithfulness in a Pluralistic Age” Symposium at Andrews University, Berrien Springs, MI, 19
October 2018).
Especially when these commitments involve ontological categories such as
God, the cosmos, and humanity.
137

138
Concepts in isolation may lead to a static, reductionistic, and distorted understanding of worldviews.
139

Allen and Springsted, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 235.
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peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic world requires such sharing and dialogue,
even when no agreement or resolution is reached.140
Fourth, in assessing competing worldview narratives, one would do well
to pay attention to points of agreement and compatibility before critiquing a
position.141
Fifth, one should be open to recognize weaknesses and blind spots
in one’s own worldview. Since people’s worldviews are dynamic and everdeveloping, awareness of such weaknesses is an integral part of maturity and
identity formation.
Sixth, worldviews are not only mental constructs but embodied realities. Thus, one actively trying to develop a worldview would benefit from
reasoning about the possible outcome of living out a controlling story. Is the
result of the grand story—its “fruit”—good and desirable? If so, consistency
(integrity) in living out the story will be beneficial to the possessor and to
others as well. If not, one could consider other stories to live by. In the end,
“worldviews are not [only] about better thinking, but about becoming better
people.”142
Finally, the seventh point is that these powerful influences—the
controlling stories—are words. Such words have a source or sources. And
it is important to know whose words they are because subscribing to and
embodying a controlling story ultimately means following someone else. The
vital questions everyone should satisfactorily be able to answer in this context
are: “whose words are you following?”143 and why?

140
The postmodern alternatives, such as the hermeneutic of suspicion (here as
distrust in the possibility of finding truth) and hostility to dialogue, if not resisted,
undermine a plural society, quench individual expression, and impede constructive
thought.
141

Jerončić, “What Worldview Discourse (Over)Promises.”

142

Ibid.

143

Cf. Vanhoozer’s article “Being Biblical in a Pluralistic Age,” in this journal, 305.

